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Survey
1985 SURVEY OF TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS
ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN THE COURTS
Carl H. Esbeck *
The purpose of this survey is to note important caselaw developments in the state and lower federal courts concerning religious liberty during 1985. Purposely omitted are the widely reported United
State Supreme Court opinions, as well as cases where the high court
has granted review during its 1985-86 term. The focus here is to collect significant cases that may otherwise escape broad attention. Only
the facts and rationale of each court's decision is recorded. No editorial comment on the merits of these cases is intended.
I.

LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES

Catholic High School Association of the Archdiocese of New York v.
Culvert, 753 F.2d 1161 (2d Cir. Jan. 10, 1985).

The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has ruled that the New
York State Labor Relations Board (Board) can assert jurisdiction
over the labor relations between parochial schools and their lay teachers. The decision reverses a summary judgment order in favor of the
Catholic High School Association (Association). The district court
had held that the exercise of jurisdiction by the Board would violate
the Establishment Clause because it "threatens to produce excessive
entanglement between church and state."
The court of appeals first addressed the issue of whether a justifiable controversy existed by reason of the mere assertion of jurisdiction
without a factual record showing actual interference with religious
beliefs. The court held that the assertion of jurisdiction necessarily
implicated the religion clauses. The potential for interference with
religious affairs was enough of a threat to the Association's constitutional rights to create a controversy.
* Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Columbia; J.D., 1974, Cornell University;
B.S., 1971, Iowa State University. The author would like to thank the Center for Law &
Religious Freedom whose monthly digest of cases the Religious Freedom Reporter, was invaluable in compiling this annual survey. Portions of the Reporter are reprinted here with permission of the Center.
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The district court had based its decision on two aspects of Board
jurisdiction. First, it found that the Association might be required to
bargain on religious subjects. Second, it found the Board would have
to determine the validity of an asserted religious reason for discharge
in cases alleging unlawful discharge. The court of appeals found that
the district court "misapprehended the degree of supervision" by the
Board over the bargaining process and that there was room for accommodation between church and state in the area of discharges.
With respect to the Board's supervision of collective bargaining,
the court of appeals found (1) the Board becomes involved only when
a complaint of an unfair labor practice is made, (2) the unfair labor
practices it may investigate are entirely secular, (3) its investigation is
limited to the charge in the complaint, (4) the Board's orders are not
self-enforcing, and (5) the Board cannot compel the parties to agree
on any specific terms. Therefore, the Board's supervision is not of the
comprehensive or continuing type, and would not involve excessive
entanglement between church and state.
The court then turned to the Board's role in cases of alleged unlawful discharge. The danger is "the possibility of recurrent questioning of whether a particular church actually holds a particular
belief. . . . Inevitably this would lead to the degradation of religion ....
Thus, the first amendment prohibits the State Board from
inquiring into an asserted religious motive to determine whether it is
pretextual." However, the court held that this restraint on the
Board's power does not preclude the exercise of jurisdiction. An accommodation can be made. The Board can determine whether the
asserted religious motive was the reason for the discharge. The Board
may not order reinstatement where there is a religious motive even if
it is coupled with an unlawful motive.
In dealing with the Association's free exercise claim, the court
found that the burden on free exercise created by the Board's jurisdiction is indirect and incidental. This minimal intrusion is justified by
the state's compelling interest in fair labor practices for all employees.
Volunteers of America - Minnesota Bar None Boys Ranch v. NLRB,
752 F.2d 345 (8th Cir. Jan. 15, 1985), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct.
3502 (June 24, 1985) (No. 84-1623).
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a decision of the
National Labor Relations Board requiring the VOA-Minnesota Bar
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None Boys Ranch (Ranch) to bargain with a union representing
Ranch employees.
The Ranch is operated by the VOA-Minnesota, a religious organization. The VOA-Minnesota operates the Ranch as a residential
treatment and religious education center for children. A Minnesota
Teamsters union local petitioned the NLRB for a representation election among the Ranch's employees. The NLRB conducted a hearing
on the petition, and at the hearing the Ranch claimed the NLRB's
exercise of power was impermissible under the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 151 et seq., and violated the religion clauses of
the first amendment. The NLRB nonetheless directed that an election be held and later certified its results, naming the union as collective bargaining representative of Ranch employees. The Ranch
refused to deal with the union, which then filed an unfair labor practice complaint with the NLRB. The NLRB granted summary judgment for the union and issued a bargaining order.
The Ranch appealed and raised two issues. The Ranch claimed
that the NLRB had exceeded its congressional grant of jurisdiction,
since Congress had not given the NLRB power over religious institutions. The Ranch also claimed that such power, even if granted by
Congress, violated the religion clauses of the first amendment. The
court, citing NLRB v. St. Louis ChristianHome, 663 F.2d 60 (8th Cir.
1981), found the Ranch to be a secular employer. The Ranch was
secular in several critical respects: it offered primarily treatment, not
religious indoctrination; the Ranch employed no staff ministers; and
Ranch employees performed secular functions. Since the Ranch was
essentially secular, the court reasoned, it fell within the jurisdiction of
the NLRB and posed no constitutional barrier to enforcing the bargaining order.
NLRB v. The Salvation Army of Massachusetts Day Care Center,
763 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. May 23, 1985).
The First Circuit Court of Appeals has ruled that the NLRB has
jurisdiction over a day-care center operated by The Salvation Army.
The court rejected The Salvation Army's argument that NLRB jurisdiction would pose a significant risk of infringement upon its first
amendment rights. The court also ruled that the religious purpose of
the day-care center was not a mandatory bargaining subject.
The court found the critical facts to be as follows: the day-care
center provides day-care services to children selected solely on the
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basis of need without regard to creed, the center provides no religious
instruction, the staff is hired without regard to creed or any other
condition of a religious nature, and the director of the center is not
required to be a member of The Salvation Army.
The court distinguished the United States Supreme Court's decision in NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490 (1979). In that case
the Supreme Court found that lay teachers at Catholic high schools
played a "critical and unique" role in fulfilling the mission of the
schools, which was described as "the propagation of a religious faith."
In the instant case the court said, "Although there is evidence that the
[day-care] center fulfills the religious mission of The Salvation Army,
there is no evidence that the center serves anything other than a secular function with respect to the children, parents, and teachers." The
court found this situation to be almost identical to that in Denver Post
of the National Society of Volunteers of America v. NLRB, 732 F.2d
769 (10th Cir. 1984.). In that case the court decided that the NLRB
did have jurisdiction over a religious organization that provided social
services of an essentially secular nature.
The court concluded that the operation of The Salvation Army's
day-care center was indistinguishable from that of a secular day-care
center since it did not include the "infusion of religion" in its programming. Therefore, a finding of NLRB jurisdiction was required.
During its negotiations with the union, The Salvation Army had
insisted on the inclusion in the contract of a clause acknowledging the
religious mission of The Salvation Army and the day-care center's
role in that mission. The union refused to negotiate regarding the
clause and the NLRB ruled that they were not required to do so because the clause was not a mandatory bargaining subject. The Salvation Army argued that without the clause it would not be able to
insure that the center would fulfill its spiritual mission. The court
held that the clause did not bear a direct relationship to the terms and
conditions of employment at the center and therefore was not a
mandatory bargaining subject. The court noted that The Salvation
Army could take into account its religious concerns during negotiations with respect to all mandatory bargaining subjects.
Rayburn v. General Conference of Seventh-day Adventists, 772 F.2d
1164 (4th Cir. Sept. 23, 1986), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 3333
(July 7, 1986) (No. 85-1071).
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has ruled that the Seventh-
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day Adventist church cannot be sued for discrimination with regard
to hiring for pastoral positions. "The guidance of the state cannot
substitute for that of the Holy Spirit," the court said.
Carole Rayburn, a graduate of the church's theological seminary,
sued the church and two of its leaders for employment discrimination
under Title VII of the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e et seq., after the church hired another woman as an associate
in pastoral care for the Sligo Seventh-day Adventist Church in
Takoma Park, Maryland. The federal district court in Baltimore
granted summary judgment in the church's favor on the grounds that
the suit was barred by the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of
the first amendment.
In affirming the district court's decision, the court of appeals
said, "Tensions have developed between our cardinal Constitutional
principles of freedom of religion.., and our national attempt to eradicate all forms of discrimination." The court resolved the tension in
favor of the church's free exercise of religion.
"The right to choose ministers without government restriction
underlies the well-being of religious community," the court said, because "perpetuation of a church's existence may depend upon those
whom it selects to preach its values, teach its message, and interpret
its doctrines both to its own membership and to the world at large."
The court added that no church member may use the first amendment
to claim an "enforceable right" to be considered for the ministry of a
church. It noted that the "evidence is simply overwhelming" that the
position for which Rayburn applied "is important to the spiritual and
pastoral mission of the church."
That the Adventist Church does not ordain women did not influence the court's analysis, the court indicated. "In quintessentially
religious matters,

. . .

the free exercise clause ... protects the act of a

decision rather than a motivation behind it."
The court said subjecting such pastoral employment decisions to
government scrutiny also would violate the Establishment Clause of
the first amendment and the concept of church-state separation:
"Bureaucratic suggestion in employment decisions of a pastoral
character, in contravention of a church's own perception of its needs
and purposes, would constitute unprecedented entanglement with
religious authority and compromise the premise that both religion
and government can best work to achieve their lofty aims if each is
left free of the other within its respective sphere."
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The court concluded that "churches are not ... and should not
be ... above the law. Like any other person or organization, they

may be held liable for their torts and upon their valid contracts.
Their employment decisions may be subject to Title VII scrutiny
where the decision does not involve the church's spiritual functions."
Ninth and "0" Street Baptist Church v. EEOC, 616 F. Supp. 1231
(W.D. Ky. Aug. 16, 1985), aff'd., 802 F.2d 459 (6th Cir. Aug.
15, 1986).
A federal district court has ruled that the EEOC has the right to
conduct an investigation of a church in order to determine whether it
has jurisdiction over a discrimination claim. Ninth and "0" Street
Baptist Church operated the Early Childhood Development Center.
The church announced a new policy that all employees of the center
would have to be members of the church. Current employees not
members of the church would be required to join the church by a
certain date or face discharge. A teacher at the center contacted the
EEOC to see if this policy violated her rights. When the church
learned of her contact with the EEOC, they fired her. She then filed a
complaint with the EEOC charging retaliatory discharge. The EEOC
served subpoenas on the church. The church filed this suit asking the
court to enjoin the EEOC from investigating it.
The church claimed that the teacher was fired because her actions violated a religious doctrine. It argued that for the EEOC to
investigate the church would violate the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the first amendment. The EEOC claimed that no
such violations would result from an investigation conducted solely to
determine its jurisdiction.
The court ruled that an EEOC investigation at this stage of proceedings would not violate either the Establishment or Free Exercise
Clauses. In finding no violation of the Establishment Clause, the
court pointed to the secular purpose of the EEOC to eliminate all
forms of discrimination. The primary effect of the investigation
would not be the inhibition of religion and it would not result in excessive entanglement between church and state. The court relied
upon the fact that the intrusion upon religious beliefs would be minimal and that no ongoing relationship would be set up. Also, the
EEOC has no power to require the church to change any policies.
In ruling on the free exercise claim, the court considered the
magnitude of the impact on religious beliefs, the existence of a com-
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pelling state interest, and the extent to which an exemption would
impede the government's objectives. The court found that the investigation would not interfere with the day-to-day activities of the
church. The court recognized the elimination of discrimination to be
a compelling state interest that justified the minimal burden on the
church's free exercise rights.
Amos v. Corporation of the PresidingBishop of the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 618 F. Supp. 1013 (D. Utah Sept.
18, 1985), prob. jurisdiction postponed, 107 S. Ct. 396
(Nov. 3, 1986) (Nos. 86-179 and 86-401).
In an earlier decision in this case, Amos v. Corporationof the Presiding Bishop, 594 F. Supp. 791 (D. Utah 1984) (Amos 1), the court
ruled that the provisions of Title VII allowing religious organizations
to discriminate on the basis of religion were unconstitutional when
applied to employment in nonreligious activities. In this decision the
court applied the test it devised in Amos I for determining whether
certain activities are religious. It applied the test to two institutions
owned by the Mormon Church. This suit was initiated by former
employees of the two institutions. They claimed that they were terminated from their employment because they did not satisfy worthiness
requirements of the Mormon Church for temple recommends.
The court reiterated the three-part test it set forth in Amos I for
determining whether an activity is religious for purposes of religious
discrimination suits. "First, the court must look at the tie between
the religious organization and the activity at issue with regard to areas
such as financial affairs, day-to-day operations and management. Second, whether or not there is a close and substantial tie between the
two, the court next must examine the nexus between the primary
function of the activity in question and the religious rituals or tenets
of the religious organization or matters of church administration. If
there is a substantial connection between the activity in question and
the organization's religious tenets or matters of church administration
and the tie under the first part of the test is close, the court does not
need to proceed any further and may declare the activity religious."
After applying the first two parts to the test, if it is not clear whether
an activity is religious, a third inquiry is to be made. "The court must
consider the relationship between the nature of the job the employee
is performing and the religious rituals or tenets of the religious organization or matters of church administration. If there is substantial relationship ... the court must find the activity religious."
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The court first considered a motion for summary judgment
against Beehive Clothing Mills. Beehive is an unincorporated division
of the Mormon Church that manufactures temple clothing, garments,
and veils. These items are considered sacred by the church. Several
of the plaintiffs were employed as seamstresses at Beehive. Beehive is
owned by the church and managed by high church officials. Its banking and accounting are handled through the church. Temple garments have not always been made in Mormon-owned facilities, and
some garments made overseas currently are made in non-Mormon
plants. Whether or not non-Mormons are currently hired at Beehive
is disputed by the parties. There is also disagreement regarding why
garments made overseas are made by non-Mormons. The court found
that resolution of these factual disputes was relevant and necessary for
application of the three-part itest. Therefore, summary judgment was
denied, and the matter was set for an evidentiary hearing.
The court next considered a motion for summary judgment regarding Deseret Industries. Deseret is a division of the Mormon
Church's Welfare Services Department. It provides employment and
training for handicapped and mentally retarded persons. These employees refurbish goods that are then provided to the needy. Deseret
is subsidized by the church, and its operations are tax-exempt. Employees come to Deseret by way of referrals from Mormon bishops.
One of the plaintiffs was a truck driver for Deseret.
All parties agreed that under the first part of the Amos I test
there is clearly a close and substantial tie between the Mormom
Church and the day-to-day activities, finances, and management of
Deseret. The dispute in this case centered on the second part of the
test. The court rejected the plaintiff's position that this inquiry
should focus on the type of job the employee performs. The analysis
calls for a much broader view of the activity of the organization. The
court must look at the purpose that the activity serves. A substantial
connection between that purpose and the tenets or administration of
the religious organization satisfies the second prong of the Amos I test.
The second prong of the Amos I test encompasses "an inquiry
into the belief system that informs the particular actions in question."
The welfare system of the Mormon Church, of which Deseret is a
part, was set up so that "independence, industry, thrift and self-respect be once more established among [Mormons]." The court cited
several sources in Mormon scriptures and history establishing the importance of welfare work in Mormon beliefs.
The court distinguished the present case from Denver Post of the

1985 COURT SURVEY

211]

National Society of Volunteers of America v. NLRB, 732 F.2d 769
(10th Cir. 1984). In that case the court found that the VOA's charitable operations were not religious. It ruled that religious motivation
was not enough to make "essentially secular" charitable activities religious actions. In the present case the court found a stronger link between Deseret and the Mormon Church than existed in the Denver
Post case. Deseret was staffed by and employed only church members. It provided assistance to bishops, and daily devotional exercises
were held. The court ruled that, were it to strictly limit religious activity to the propagation or advocation of religious beliefs, it would
"drastically curtail the scope of protection provided by the first
amendment."
The court found a close and substantial nexus between Deseret's
primary function and the religious tenets of the Mormon Church.
Since both the first and second prong of the Amos I test were satisfied,
Deseret's activities were religious. Therefore, the court granted summary judgment for the church with regard to the discrimination
charges against Deseret Industries.
II.

TAXES AND TAX REGULATION

Salem College and Academy, Inc. v. Employment Division, 298 Or.
471, 695 P.2d 25 (Jan. 15, 1985).
The Oregon Supreme Court has ruled that all religious schools in
Oregon must pay state unemployment compensation taxes. This case
presented the difficult task of interpreting state law so as to comply, if
possible, with both the standards of the Federal Unemployment Tax
Act (FUTA) and the religious liberty guarantees of the Oregon Constitution. The task was further complicated by the questionable validity of the current federal interpretation of FUTA standards.
In order for employers to get credit for state unemployment taxes
when paying the federal tax, the state tax system must comply with
federal standards as to the type of employers included within the system. It is permissible for the state law to require participation by a
greater number of employers than is required by the FUTA standards. Current FUTA policy exempts churches, associations of
churches, and "any organization which is operated, supervised, controlled or principally supported by a church or convention or association of churches." The Supreme Court in St. Martin Lutheran
Church v. South Dakota, 451 U.S. 772 (1981), ruled that this exemption includes schools "integrated into a church's structure." The
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Supreme Court has not ruled on the validity of distinguishing between
such schools and religious schools separately incorporated. Such a
distinction is current federal policy.
The Oregon Court of Appeals had ruled that this distinction violated the Establishment Clause of the first amendment. Its opinion
ordered an exemption for Salem College and Academy, a separately
incorporated school. The Oregon Supreme Court found that it was
unnecessary for the court of appeals to decide the case on federal constitutional grounds. It interpreted the state tax statute in such a way
as to comply with state law and the FUTA standards.
The court found that taxing religious schools on an equal basis
with other employers does not violate their right to the free exercise of
religion. The court then stated:
The free exercise of religion and rights of conscience, Or. Const.,
Art. I, sec. 2, may not relieve religious schools from providing unemployment insurance for their employees, but if the state chooses
to exempt organizations from that duty by virtue of their religious
character, it cannot discriminate among otherwise similar religious
schools by their structural relationship with one or another form of
church or religious congregation.
To obtain the uniform treatment compelled by the Oregon Constitution by exempting all religious schools, would risk nonconformity
with FUTA should the present distinction in federal policy be eventually upheld by the Supreme! Court as nonviolative of the Establishment Clause. Therefore, since the intent of the legislature was clearly
to have the state law comply with FUTA standards, the proper interpretation of state law was to require all religious schools to participate
in the system. Under such an interpretation, state law would comply
with FUTA regardless of how the question of the validity of present
policy was resolved.
Baltimore Lutheran High School Association, Inc. v. Employment
Security Administration, 302 Md. 649, 490 A.2d 701 (Md.
App. Apr. 10, 1985).
The Court of'Appeals of Maryland has upheld a decision that
employees of Baltimore Lutheran High School Association, Inc. (Lutheran) do not qualify for an exemption from the provisions of the
Maryland unemployment compensation tax. Lutheran had sought a
determination that they were exempt as employees of "an organization operated primarily for religious purposes and which is operated,
supervised, controlled or principally supported by a church or con-
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vention or association of churches." There was no contention in this
case that Lutheran was not an organization operated by a church.
Lutheran was an association of Lutheran churches, all members of
the Missouri Synod, which operated Baltimore Lutheran High
School. The only question was whether Lutheran was operated primarily for religious purposes.
This case had previously been remanded by the court of appeals
to the Employment Security Division Board of Appeals to hear further evidence regarding this issue and to reconsider its original determination that Lutheran was not operated primarily for religious
purposes. Specifically, the Board was to accept evidence regarding (1)
the nature of mandatory chapel services, (2) whether religion classes
were devoted to the indoctrination of a particular faith, and (3) what
impact religious viewpoint had on the teaching methodology and the
substantive content of other courses. Also, the Board was to consider
whether the school subscribed to principles of academic freedom. On
remand, the only evidence presented by Lutheran was the testimony
of the principal of the high school. The Board once again determined
that the evidence did not meet the burden required of Lutheran to
show that it was operated primarily for religious purposes.
The court ruled that in light of its limited ability to review factual determinations of the Board, it could not overturn this determination. It found the record as a whole could reasonably support the
finding of the Board. The Board had considered all of the factors set
out by the court when it remanded the case.
Inasmuch as the court upheld the determination of the Board
that Lutheran did not qualify for an exemption under the statute, the
court proceeded to consider Lutheran's alternative argument that the
application of the unemployment tax to its employees violates the
Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the first amendment.
The court found that the decision of the United States Supreme
Court in United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982), was dispositive of
Lutheran's free exercise claim. Lutheran argued that the refusal to
grant an exemption would adversely affect Lutheran's desire to employ teachers who communicate the doctrine of the Synod and would
limit its ability to assign employees to activities in furtherance of their
religious mission. Assuming these burdens existed, the court stated
that it did not believe that they amounted to the type of burden that
was not justified by compelling state interest. The state's very high
interest in avoiding the dangers of involuntary unemployment was
sufficiently compelling to override the alleged limitations on Lu-
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theran's religious liberty. Granting an exemption to Lutheran would
unduly interfere with the fulfillment of the state's interest.
With regard to Lutheran's Establishment Clause claim, the court
noted that Lutheran based this claim entirely on the argument that
application of the tax scheme to Lutheran would result in an excessive
entanglement of church and state. The court pointed out that the
burdens of the tax did not fall any heavier on religious institutions
than it did on any other employers. The administrative burdens were
not greater than a host of other regulations such as fire and safety
codes. Lutheran also claimed that it would not be able to discharge
employees for doctrinal reasons without opening its doctrines up to
state scrutiny in litigation involving eligibility for unemployment benefits. The court did not believe that discharges for doctrinal reasons
were so frequent as to require an exemption from the unemployment
compensation system entirely. Such cases could be dealt with on an
individual basis when they arose. For these reasons the court found
no Establishment Clause violation.
Lutheran Social Services of Minnesota v. United States, 758 F.2d
1283 (8th Cir. Apr. 3, 1985).
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has ruled that Lutheran
Social Services (LSS), a church-affiliated tax-exempt organization, is
exempt from filing annual informational returns with the IRS. LSS
had argued that it was exempt from the filing requirements of 26
U.S.C. § 6033 because it is a church or because it is a convention of
churches. The court rejected both of these arguments. However, the
court agreed with LSS that it was an integrated auxiliary of a church
and therefore exempt from the filing requirements of § 6033. In so
ruling, the court overturned a treasury regulation that required an
organization to have a principal activity that is exclusively religious in
order to meet the definition of an integrated auxiliary.
LSS is affiliated with the three main Lutheran bodies in the
United States: the Lutheran Church in America, the American Lutheran Church and the Lutheran ChurCh-Missouri Synod. It provides various social services including family counseling, residential
treatment for retarded persons, nutrition programs, and communitybased correctional programs for young male felons. LSS admits that
many of its services would be: secular if performed by a secular organization. LSS maintains that its services are religious in that they are
"religiously motivated, a manifestation of religious belief, a form of
worship and a means of propagation of the Christian faith."
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The court applied the definition of "church" contained in Treasury Regulation § 1.511-2(a)(3)(ii), and other criteria set forth by the
IRS in determining whether LSS was entitled to a filing exemption as
a church. Among the provisions of the regulation is a requirement
that the organization's duties include the "ministration of sacerdotal
functions." The court ruled that the services provided by LSS are
secular in nature and "cannot be transformed into 'ministrations of
sacerdotal functions' merely because they are performed by a religiously affiliated organization." Therefore, LSS could not be considered a church within the meaning of § 6033.
For the same reason, LSS could not be considered a convention
or association of churches. This term was merely intended to include
congregational churches within the meaning of churches so that they
would not be treated differently from hierarchical churches.
However, the court did find LSS to be an integrated auxiliary of a
church.
The court struck down Treasury Regulation
§ 1.60332(g)(5)(i). This regulation required that an integrated auxiliary have a principal activity that is exclusively religious. The regulations defined "exclusively religious" as activities other than
"educational, literary, charitable or of another nature (other than religious) that would serve as a basis for exemption under section
501(c)(3)."
The court found the IRS regulation to be contrary to the plain
language and the legislative history of § 6033. The legislative history
contained references to the types of organizations that were intended
to be considered integrated auxiliaries. Many of these organizations
were of the type that clearly would not have a principal activity that
was exclusively religious. The court found it significant that Congress
included an "exclusively religious" requirement for religious orders in
the same section of the statute but did not impose that restriction on
integrated auxiliaries.
III.

PUBLIC SCHOOLS

Aguillard v. Edwards, 765 F.2d 1251 (5th Cir. July 8, 1985),
rehearingdenied, 778 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. Dec. 12, 1985) (en
banc), prob. juris noted, 106 S. Ct. 1946 (May 5, 1986)
(No. 85-1513).
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has affirmed the summary
judgment of the district court, Aguillard v. Treen, No. 81-4787 (E.D.
La. Jan. 10, 1985), striking down a Louisiana law requiring the teach-
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ing of creation-science in the public schools whenever evolution is
taught. The court held that the law violates the Establishment Clause
of the first amendment.
The court stated, "This particular case is a simple one, subject to
a simple disposal: The Act violates the Establishment Clause of the
first amendment because the purpose of the statute is to promote a
religious belief." The court went on to say, "Irrespective of whether it
is fully supported by scientific evidence, the theory of creation is a
religious belief." The court rejected the state's argument that the purpose of the act was to promote academic freedom. The court said that
requiring the teaching of a particular theory was contrary to the very
concept of academic freedom. Judged against the historical background of the struggle by religious fundamentalists to discredit the
theory of evolution, the court found that the purpose of the statute
was to promote creation-science as a religious belief. The court said
that because the statute required the teaching of creation-science only
when evolution was taught, its religious purpose was demonstrated.
Graham v. Central Community School District of Decatur County,
608 F. Supp. 531 (S.D. Iowa May 9, 1985).
In this case a federal district court has enjoined a public school
district from including a religious invocation and a religious benediction in its graduation ceremonies. For at least the last twenty years
the school district had opened and closed its graduation ceremonies
with a prayer led by a Christian minister.
The court ruled that the purpose of the invocation and benediction was religious and that there was no secular purpose. The court
also ruled that the primary effect of the prayers was to advance the
Christian religion. The court emphasized that its decision was based
on the specific facts developed at the hearing in this case. The minister scheduled to deliver the invocation and benediction for the 1985
ceremonies testified that he believed the purpose for the prayers was
religious. Three expert witnesses also testified that the purpose of
graduation prayers was religious. The school superintendent testified
that the prayers were a tradition, the purpose of which was to lend a
"serious note" to the ceremonies. The court found that prayer is inherently religious.
The court rejected the school district's argument that banning
the prayers would infringe the free exercise rights of others. The Free
Exercise Clause "does not give [people] a right to have government
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provide them public prayer at government functions and ceremonies,
even if the majority would like it."
Stein v. Plainwell Community Schools, 610 F. Supp 43 (W.D. Mich.
Mar. 22, 1985).
In this case a federal district court refused to issue a preliminary
injunction prohibiting the inclusion of an invocation and a benediction in graduation ceremonies. Under the stipulated facts, the court
believed that the school district would win a trial on the merits. The
court applied the three-part test of Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602
(1971), to the facts. It found that there was a secular legislative purpose, no primary effect of advancing religion, and no excessive entanglement between church and state.
The court noted that the purpose of the individual giving the
benediction could be religious while the purpose of the school district
in allowing the prayers could be secular. The court found that the
evidence showed that the prayers were included for ceremonial purposes as part of a long-standing tradition. Also, the schools had a
purpose of letting students plan or participate in the ceremonies. At
one school the students gave the invocation and benediction and at
the other the students decided to invite a minister to give them.
The court cited six factors that indicated that the primary effect
of the policy was not to advance religion. First, the graduation ceremony is not a mandatory event; attendance is voluntary. Second, the
schools exercise no control over the content of the invocation and
benediction. The school board does not decide whether such prayers
will be included but merely acquiesces in the decision of the students.
Third, the prayers are not a daily event. They are heard once a year,
each time by a different audience. Fourth, those hearing the prayers
are not impressionable children, but largely adults. This includes the
graduating seniors themselves. Fifth, the graduation is not an educational program, but a ceremonial one. Finally, there is no evidence
that the invocations or benedictions are used to proselytize.
The court also held that there was no excessive entanglement between church and state. The schools did not write or control the content of the prayers. The ceremonies were held only once a year, there
was no continuing relationship between church and state.
Ford v. Manuel, 629 F. Supp. 771 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 8, 1985).
A federal district court has ruled that the use of public school
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facilities by a community organization to teach religion classes immediately before of after regular school classes is unconstitutional. The
Findlay, Ohio, Board of Education adopted a policy of allowing the
community to use school facilities when it did not interfere with regular school activities. One of the groups that rented school facilities
under this policy was the Findlay Weekday Religious Education
Council (WREC). The WREC taught religion classes once a week in
the elementary schools. These classes either ended 15 minutes prior
to regular classes or began five minutes after regular classes ended for
the day. They were taught by nonschool personnel, and attendance
was voluntary. For the 1984-85 school year, school personnel were
prohibited from passing out advertisements, permission slips, or any
other material regarding the religion classes. The classes were conducted during the time all public school personnel were required to be
on school premises. The WREC received contributions from some
Findlay Parent-Teacher Organizations. The organizations received
funds from membership contributions and fund raising activities.
The court found that the WREC program impermissibly advanced religion in violation of the Establishment Clause. Although
there was a valid secular purpose for the school board's policy and the
program did not result in excessive entanglement between church and
state, the program's primary effect was found to be the advancement
of religion. The court believed that the religion classes created the
appearance of official support of religion in the eyes of elementary
school students. This impression was given to all students, those in
the WREC classes and those not in the classes. The program was
"inextricably bound up with the educational function of the public
schools." The requirement that public school teachers be present at
the time of the classes, and the close juxtaposition of the religion
classes and regular classes, led to this "erroneous" impression. Due
to their timing, the: classes also benefited from the compulsory education laws of Ohio.
The court distinguished the building use by the WREC from the
use by the Worldwide Church of God, which rented the schools for
religious services and Bible study. The court found the fact that the
church rented the facilities at night and on weekends to be the crucial
difference. The message of state support of religion would be minimal
because school children and teachers would not be present at those
times.
The court also rejected the argument that the schools were public
forums. Schools are not traditional public forums, and the court
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found nothing to indicate that they had been turned into limited open
forums during the hours they are in use by school personnel.
The court characterized its decision as narrow. It emphasized
the timing of the classes as well as the age of the children and location, as reasons for its decision.
May v. Evansville-Vanderburgh School Corporation, 615 F. Supp.
761 (S.D. Ind. June 27, 1985), aff'd., 787 F.2d 1105 (7th Cir.
1986).
A federal district court has ruled that a school board may prohibit voluntary prayer meetings by school employees on school property. Such a policy, the court ruled, does not violate the free speech
or free exercise rights of the employees.
Mary May, a teacher's aid, along with other teacher's aides and
teachers, were holding prayer meetings on school grounds prior to the
commencement of the official school day. No students attended the
meetings. When the meetings came to the attention of the school
board, the board ordered that they be discontinued.
The court first addressed the question of whether the school was
a public forum. The court noted that not all government-owned
property becomes a public forum simply by its existence. Public
schools are not inherently public forums; rather, affirmative steps
must be taken in order to create a public forum at a public school.
The court found that no such steps were taken by the school district.
On the contrary, the school district had a consistent policy prohibiting religious activity on school grounds. No other formal meetings of
teachers were held other than those necessary to conduct normal
school business. Since there was no public forum created, there was
no violation of the free speech rights of the employees.
The court next examined the school district's policy with respect
to the Establishment Clause. The court found that the school board
policy of not allowing religious activity on school property had a secular purpose of establishing a neutral policy towards religion. The policy does not have the primary effect of advancing religion. On the
contrary, it serves opposite ends. It avoids the need for any continuing supervision of religious meetings that might lead to excessive entanglement between church and state. The court concluded that there
was a compelling state interest to follow the Establishment Clause
that overrides the alleged violations to the plaintiff's association,
equal protection, and free exercise rights.
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PRIVATE/PAROCHIAL SCHOOLS AND UNIVERSITIES

Johnson v. Charles City Comm. Schools Bd., 368 N.W.2d 74 (Iowa
May 22, 1985), cert. denied sub nom. Pruessnerv. Benton, 106
S. Ct. 594 (Dec. 16, 1985 (No. 85-671).
The Iowa Supreme Court upheld the provision of the Iowa compulsory education statute that requires students not attending public
schools to attend schools giving "equivalent instruction by a certified
teacher." The parents of school-age children being prosecuted under
the compulsory education law had challenged the law as a violation of
their free exercise rights. The parents were sending their children to
private religious school. The religious school refused to submit to any
regulation by the state.
The court rejected "out of hand" the parents' argument that the
Free Exercise Clause requires the state to accommodate their absolute
and total rejection of any regulation. Although the first amendment
imposes limitations on the state's power to regulate the education of
children, that powe:r "plainly extends to such matters as basic parameters for curriculum and teacher qualifications." The state has a clear
right to set minimum educational standards. The court was careful to
point out that the appeal in this case did not challenge any particular
minimum standard of the vagueness of the statutory provision. Instead, the right of the state to regulate was the only issue raised.
The court also upheld an administrative determination that the
parents in this case did not qualify for an "Amish exemption" from
the compulsory attendance laws. That exemption requires parents to
demonstrate that their church "professes principles or tenets that differ substantially from the objectives, goals and philosophy of education embodied in standards set forth in [Iowa statutes]." The court
believed that the legislature intended this exemption to be applied
narrowly and that the exemption was not to be given to all who seek
to provide a religiously oriented education. The court found that the
parents had failed to point to any tenets of their faith that were inconsistent with the minimum educational goals of the state.
Stark v. St. Cloud State University, 604 F. Supp. 1555 (D. Minn.
Mar. 29, 1985), aff'd, 802 F.2d 1046 (8th Cir. Oct. 8, 1986).
A federal district court has ruled that a state university policy
allowing university students to satisfy their teaching requirements at
private parochial schools violates the Establishment Clause of the first
amendment. The court found that the policy impermissibly advanced

211]

1985 COURT SURVEY

religion and that the type of surveillance necessary to prevent such an
advancement of religion would result in excessive entanglement of
church and state.
Under the program, a student teacher is placed in an elementary
or high school classroom and takes over the teaching of that class
under the supervision of the regular teacher and a faculty supervisor
from the university. The policy provides for the placement of a student teacher in a parochial school only upon the request of the student teacher. The policy further provides that any involvement on
the part of the student teacher in the religious aspect of the parochial
school program "is exclusively between the parochial school and the
student teacher." Schools in which student teachers are placed are
paid a fee by the university.
The court reviewed the line of United States Supreme Court
cases dealing with state aid to parochial schools and found the policy
in this case involved a much greater entanglement than is permissible
under the Establishment Clause. The student teachers were placed in
a role equivalent to that of the regular parochial school teacher and
were under the supervision and guidance of the parochial school
teacher. The policy made no attempt to safeguard against the student
teacher becoming involved in the religious indoctrination of students.
The policy does not require that the fees paid to the parochial schools
be used for secular purposes.
The court rejected the university's argument that this case was
distinguishable because the university was not providing aid to the
parochial schools but instead the parochial schools were providing a
service to the university for which a fee was paid. The court stated
that the fact that placement in parochial schools was initiated at the
request of the parochial school indicated that the policy did help the
school advance its functions. The schools received benefits such as an
opportunity to evaluate prospective teachers, exposure to the latest
teaching techniques, and the symbolic benefit of association with a
state university.
Gay Rights Coalition v. Georgetown University, 496 A.2d 567,
vacated and set for reargument, 496 A.2d 587 (D.C. App. July
30, 1985) (en banc).
A three-judge panel of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
issued an opinion reversing the trial court's judgment in favor of Georgetown University. In a rare move on the same day, the court of
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appeals issued an order vacating the panel's decision and resetting the
case for argument before the entire court.
The vacated opinion ruled that the university must grant official
recognition to gay student groups despite the religious objections of
the university. The suit was brought by two gay student organizations alleging that the university's refusal to grant them official recognition was a violation of the District of Columbia Human Rights Act.
That act prohibits discrimination by an education institution on the
basis of sexual orientation. The trial court had ruled that the Free
Exercise Clause of the first amendment prevented the application of
the statute to Georgetown University, a Roman Catholic institution.
The court of appeals, in the panel decision, ruled that although
official recognition meant "endorsement," such endorsement merely
conveyed tolerance and not approval. The panel went on to find that
the District of Columbia had a compelling interest in eliminating discrimination. In making this finding, the panel relied upon the high
priority given to the act by the Council of the District of Columbia.
There were no less restrictive: means by which to enforce this compelling interest because equal access to facilities, which the university
had already granted, was not enough. "Equal citizenship" is what the
act required. Without official recognition there would still be discrimination. The panel concluded that the burden upon the university's
free exercise rights was outweighed by the District's compelling interest. The university was not being compelled to espouse any repugnant
views and could alleviate any burden by disclaiming any approval of
the views of the gay organizations.
V.

HOME SCHOOLING

Delconte v. North Carolina, 313 N.C. 384, 329 S.E2d 636 (May 7,
1985).
The North Carolina Supreme Court ruled that the home instruction of school-age children by their parents does not violate North
Carolina laws. The court found it unnecessary to determine whether
a statutory scheme that prohibited home schooling would violate the
constitutional rights of parents. This suit was initiated by parents
who were teaching their children at home. They sought a declaration
that they were in compliance with North Carolina's compulsory attendance laws.
In reversing the court of appeals, the court rejected the reasoning
that the intrinsic meaning of the word "school" required an institu-
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tion of a character different from schooling at home. The court found
that the North Carolina legislature had evinced an intent to set objective standards to measure the quality of education being received by
students without an intent to mandate any particular instructional
setting. This interpretation of compulsory attendance laws followed
the spirit of the law, which was to ensure that all children be educated, not that they be educated in any particular way.
The record indicated that the Delconte's home instruction complied with all of the statutory standards. Records were kept on attendance, immunization and standardized test scores. Health and
safety inspections were permitted, and the schooling was carried out
on a regular schedule that complied with the statutory standards.
The court agreed with the trial court's conclusion that the instruction
provided to the Delconte children met the standards set out in North
Carolina's compulsory attendance laws.
Although the court declined to address them, it acknowledged
that serious constitutional questions would arise if the court were to
rule that North Carolina's laws prohibited home schooling. The
court said that the United States Supreme Court decisions in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), and Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510 (1925), although not necessarily controlling under the facts
of this case, shed considerable doubt on such statutory scheme.
Ellis v. O'Hara, 612 F. Supp. 379 (E.D. Mo. July 5, 1985), rev'd.,
802 F.2d 462 (8th Cir. July 1, 1986).
A federal district court in Missouri has struck down the Missouri
compulsory education statute as being unconstitutionally vague. The
plaintiffs were Christian parents who were giving their school-age
children home education and religious instruction. The court found
the statute void for vagueness because it allows for home education
only if the instruction given is found to be "substantially equivalent"
to public school instruction, and the term "substantially equivalent"
cannot be given a reasonably precise definition.
Minnesota v. Budke, 371 N.W.2d 533, Minnesota v. Newstrom, 371
N.W.2d 525 (Minn. July 19, 1985).
In these companion cases, the Minnesota Supreme Court declared unconstitutional a portion of the Minnesota compulsory education law. The court found the statute to be impermissibly vague. The
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decision overturned the criminal convictions, in these two cases, of
parents who had been educating their children at home.
The Minnesota compulsory education statute required students
not attending public schools to be taught by "teachers whose qualifications are essentially equivalent to the minimum standards for public
school teachers of the same grades or subjects." The court found the
term "essentially equivalent" to be insufficiently definite to apprise ordinary people of the requirements of the statute. The term "is at best
ambiguous" and implies a judgment without indicating who is to
make the judgment or what criteria are to be used. The court found
that "the evidence on the record indicates that the Newstroms intended to comply with the compulsory education law and in good
faith believed that Jeanne Newstrom's credentials were 'essentially
equivalent' to those of a licensed teacher."
The court refused to impose a strict construction on the language
of the statute that would interpret it to require certified teachers for
all students. The court believed this construction to be inconsistent
with the intent of the legislature to provide some flexibility. The court
stated, "It may well be that in that small margin of flexibility lies the
constitutional protection afforded parents to direct the education of
their children without unreasonable restrictions by the state."
VI.

STATE REGULATION OF PARACHURCH MINISTRIES

Texas v. Corpus Christi People's Baptist Church, 683 S.W.2d 692
(Tex. Dec. 19, 1984) (rehearing denied, Fed. 13, 1985), app.
dismissed, 106 S. Ct. 32 (Oct. 7, 1985) (No. 84-1791).
The Texas Supreme Court, reversing the state court of appeals,
held that the state licensing procedure for twenty-four hour child care
facilities did not violate the religion clauses of the first amendment.
The State of Texas requires child care facilities operating in the
state to obtain a license. The purpose of the state legislature in enacting the license requirement is to insure that the facilities meet minimal
requirements for safety and health. The legislature also made it clear
that such licensing requirements were not to interfere with the content of the religious curriculum or the organization of religious
schools.
People's Baptist Church refused to conform to the licensing procedures, and the state sued for an injunction to force People's Baptist
Church to comply. The trial court found the licensing procedure vio-
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lated the religion clauses of both the federal and Texas Constitutions.
An appeals court affirmed.
The Texas Supreme Court reversed. The court first found that
the licensing procedure did not offend the Establishment Clause, citing the test set forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). The
court reasoned that if the state regulated nonreligious facilities while
exempting religious facilities, the result would "advance religion," an
impermissible result under Lemon. Moreover, there was no "excessive entanglement" between the state and religious facilities, because
the state licensing scheme expressly forbids inquiry into curriculum.
The court next found the licensing scheme did not violate the
first amendment's Free Exercise Clause. The court determined that
the state had a compelling interest in protecting the health and safety
of its children. The court, utilizing the test set forth in Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), then reasoned that the licensing scheme
afforded the least restrictive means of furthering that interest.
Kansas ex rel. Pringle v. Heritage Baptist Temple, 236 Kan. 544,
693 P.2d 1163 (Jan. 26, 1985).
The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's issuance of
an injunction sought by the State of Kansas to prevent Heritage Baptist Temple from operating a day-care center without a license as required by Kan. Stat. Ann. 65-501 et seq.
Heritage Baptist Temple had operated a day-care center since
1974, except for a period in late 1979 and 1980. Although the church
had obtained a license for the day-care center prior to 1983, it did not
renew its license from the state for that year. The church claimed it
conducted a "preschool ministry," not a day-care center, and thus did
not fall within the statutory scheme. Church leaders indicated they
believed the day-care center was a religious activity protected by the
first amendment.
The trial court granted an injunction, finding that the church
came within the ambit of the license requirement and finding that the
church had not proven a religious liberty interest sufficient to preclude the state from requiring the day-care center be licensed.
On appeal the Kansas Supreme Court defined the issue as
whether the trial court erred in finding that Heritage Baptist Temple
did not have a protected free exercise interest. The Supreme Court
began by asserting the doctrine that a state may reasonably limit the
free exercise of religion so as to protect the health and safety of its
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citizens. The court then proceeded to evaluate Heritage Baptist's
claim under the tests set forth in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205
(1972).
The court held that the church was not furthering a "genuine
religious belief," as in the first requirement of Yoder, when it operated
the day-care center. The court found it significant that the operations
the state sought to regulate were the "secular" activities of the center,
i.e., feeding, clothing and sheltering children; that the center charged
a fee for its services; and that most attending children were not
church members. The court noted that Baptist doctrine did not mandate the operation of day-care centers. Using the same analysis, the
court then concluded that the licensing requirement did not impermissibly burden Heritage Baptist's religious practice since, as the
court previously noted, the state concerned itself with regulating the
secular aspects of the operation, leaving Heritage free to pursue its
religious aims.

VII.

TORT ACTIONS

Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Valley, No. NCC 18668-B
(Cal. Super. Ct., Los Angeles County, May 16, 1985), appeal
docketed, No. B015721 (Cal. App., 2d Dist., 1985).
The plaintiffs in this case alleged that their son committed suicide as a result of counseling he received at Grace Community
Church. The case went to trial on remand from the California Court
of Appeal, 157 Cal. App. 3d 912, 204 Cal. Rptr. 303 (1984). On August 30, 1984, the California Supreme Court denied hearing in the
case and ordered the opinion of the court of appeal not to be officially
published. After presentation of the plaintiff's case, the trial court
granted the church's motion for nonsuit as to all three counts and
dismissed this action. The court ruled that the claims in the first two
counts of the complaint were barred by the religion clauses of the first
amendment. The court also ruled that the evidence presented was
insufficient to sustain these claims even if they were not barred by the
Constitution. The third count was dismissed for insufficient evidence.
The first two counts attempted to impose on the church the duty
to investigate Kenneth Nally's suicidal manifestations; the duty to inform other professionals of his suicidal manifestations; the duty to
refer Nally to mental health professionals; and the duty to train and
employ competent counselors and make them available to Nally. The
court held that for courts to attempt to regulate and impose standards
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on pastoral counseling would have a chilling effect on the free exercise
of religion. Such an attempt to regulate would require the courts to
set standards for competence, training, the types of problems that pastoral counselors could address and who may be counseled. For courts
to attempt such regulation would plunge them into a "bottomless
pit." The court found no compelling state interest to justify court
interference in pastoral counseling.
The court also ruled that the evidence submitted by the plaintiffs
did not establish a breach of the alleged duties and did not establish
any proximate cause between any alleged breach of duty and Nally's
suicide. The third count alleged intentional infliction of mental distress. The court found that the evidence did not establish a claim
under that count and that the evidence did not establish any proximate cause between the actions of the church and Nally's suicide.
Christofferson v. Church of Scientology, No. A7704-05184 (Or. Cir.
Ct., Multnomah County July 19, 1985).
The trial court in this case declared a mistrial after a jury
awarded the plaintiff a $39 million judgment. The case had been retried after the Oregon Court of Appeals reversed a previous judgment
of $2 million against the Church of Scientology. 57 Or. App. 203, 644
P.2d 577 (182), appeal dismissed, 293 Or. 456, 650 P.2d 928 (1982),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1227 (1983).
Christofferson, a former Scientologist, sued the church alleging
fraud. She claimed that she was promised better eyesight and a
higher I.Q. if she took one of Scientology's courses. The trial court
ruled that a mistrial had to be granted because of improper prejudicial
statements made by Christofferson's attorney during jury arguments
and because the judge had failed to instruct the jury properly on evidentiary matters. The improper jury argument was in regard to
whether or not Scientology was a religion. The court of appeals had
already ruled that it was a religion.
VIII.

INTRACHURCH DISPUTES

Reid v. Gholson, 229 Va. 179, 327 S.E.2d 107 (Mar. 8, 1985), cert.
denied, 106 S. Ct. 80 (Oct. 7, 1985) (No. 84-1926, rehearing
denied, 106 S..Ct. 548 (Dec. 2, 1985).
The Virginia Supreme Court has ruled that an equity court in
this case properly appointed a commissioner to run and oversee a congregational meeting in order to resolve a dispute between two factions
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of a congregational church. The Supreme Court found that such a
remedy was not an infringement of the Establishment Clause.
The dispute began when a group of dissenters went to court in an
attempt to force an audit of the financial records of the church. The
pastor and his followers responded by proposing changes in the
church's constitution that would centralize decision-making power in
an executive council and remove from the membership the right to
vote on questions concerning church property and all other controversial subjects. The executive council would also have the power to
terminate church membership without prior notice. The dissenters
complained that at two subsequent congregational meetings various
actions on the part of the pastor's faction resulted in the meetings
being fundamentally undemocratic. The trial court invalidated the
results of these meetings and appointed a commissioner in chancery
to run and oversee a meeting at which questions of title to property
and constitutional changes would be voted on.
On appeal the pastor argued that any judicial inquiry into church
governance is in itself an unwarranted intrusion into ecclesiastical affairs by civil authorities. It does not matter, he argued, that the dispute does not involve matters of doctrine.
The court conceded that in hierarchical churches ecclesiastical
determinations are constitutionally immune from judicial review even
when the issue is merely one of internal governance, because in such
churches the resolution of internal governmental disputes depends
upon matters of doctrine. One accepts the internal rules of such a
church and the decisions of its tribunals when becoming a member.
"Congregational churches, on the other hand, are governed by the
will of the majority ....

When the majority has spoken in a fairly

conducted congregational meeting held after proper notice to the
membership,.., its decision is constitutionally immune from judicial
review." However, this does not preclude a member from seeking
court protection to insure a fairly conducted meeting in the first place.
A member of a congregational church cannot appeal to a higher
church tribunal. His only appeal is to "simple and fundamental principles of democratic right to attend and advocate one's views and the
right to an honest count of the: votes." These neutral principles of law
are fundamental to our notions of due process. "Therefore," the
court concluded, "the authorities which preclude the courts from examining whether an hierarchical church correctly followed its own
internal procedures, or correctly applied its canon law, are inapposite
to the question before us."
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The court found that the unrefuted evidence made a clear showing that the civil and property rights of the dissenters was threatened.
Therefore, this was a proper case for judicial intervention. The remedy fashioned by the trial court was not overly intrusive.
XI.

CHAPLAINCY PROGRAMS

Katcoffv. Marsh, 755 F.2d 223 (2d Cir. Jan. 22, 1985).
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has upheld a district court
ruling that the Army's chaplaincy program, in general, does not violate the Establishment Clause. However, the court remanded to the
district court two specific issues regarding particular minor aspects of
the program.
The court noted that if the chaplaincy program were viewed
solely with the Establishment Clause in mind, it would no doubt be
unconstitutional since its primary effect is to advance religion. However, the court stated that other provisions of the Constitution must
be considered and, if possible, interpreted compatibly with the Establishment Clause. Two other constitutional provisions bear directly on
the issues in this case. They are the War Power Clause of Article I,
Sec. 8 and the Free Exercise Clause.
The court stated that deference must be accorded to Congress'
exercise of its war powers and to the expert opinion of the military as
to its needs respecting morale and discipline, but that this deference
did not preclude an analysis of the permissibility of the chaplaincy
program. After a review of the needs of the chaplaincy program, the
court characterized an alternative program proposed by the plaintiffs
as "will-o'-the-wisp" and "so inherently impractical as to border on
the frivolous." The court also noted that having no chaplaincy program at all could very well violate the free exercise rights of individual
soldiers.
X.

RELIGIOUS SYMBOLS

Friedman v. Board of Country Com'rs. of Bernalillo County, 781
F.2d 777 (10th Cir. Dec. 26, 1985) (en banc), cert. denied, 106
S. Ct. 2890 (June 9, 1986) (No. 85-1600).
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, on rehearing en banc, has
vacated an earlier panel opinion and held that a county government's
use of a seal bearing religious symbols violates the Establishment
Clause.

JOURNAL OF LAW & RELIGION

[Vol. 4

The circular seal in question bears the phrases, "Bernalillo
County," and "State of New Mexico," separated by two diamonds
along its outermost green edge. Within an inner circle, the Spanish
motto, "CON ESTA VENCEMOS," which translates as, "With This
We Conquer," or 'With This We Overcome," arches over a golden
latin cross, lightened by white edging and a blaze of golden light. The
motto and cross are set in a blue background depicting the sky over
four darker blue mountains and a green plain. Eight white sheep
stand on the plain.
The testimony was conflicting as to the purpose and meaning of
the seal. It was used on county documents, stationery, motor vehicles
and shoulder patches. There was testimony that the cross represented
the role of the Catholic Church in the settlement of the Southwest.
Specifically, there was testimony that the cross and motto referred to
priests and friars that accompanied Spanish conquistadors into the
area. Witnesses conflicted as to whether the sheep were symbolic of
the sheep-raising industry in the county's history or to the "flock of
Jesus."
The majority held that the effect prong of the Lemon test was
violated because the seal "provides a significant symbolic benefit to
religion in the minds of some." The court found that "the seal as used
conveys a strong impression to the average observer that Christianity
is being endorsed. It recalls a less tolerant time and foreshadows its
return." The court thought it plausible that a "person approached by
officers leaving a patrol car emblazoned with this seal could reasonably assume that the officers were Christian police, and that the organization they represented identified itself with the Christian God.
A follower of any non-Christian religion might well question the officers' ability to provide even-handed treatment. A citizen with no
strong religious conviction might conclude that secular benefit could
be obtained by becoming a Christian."
Copies of the county seal are reproduced in an appendix to the
opinion.
XI.

MEDICAL CARE

Mercy Hospital, Inc. v. Jackson, 62 Md. App. 409, 489 A.2d 1130
(Apr. 4, 1985), vacated, 306 Md. 556, 510 A.2d 562 (June 30,
1986).
The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland has ruled that a competent, conscious, rational, pregnant adult may refuse for religious

211]

1985 COURT SURVEY

reasons to submit to blood transfusions during a Caesarean section
delivery if the refusal does not endanger the health of the child. The
mother in this case, a Jehovah's Witness, held religious beliefs that
prevented her from consenting to a blood transfusion. The hospital
sought a court order for the appointment of a guardian who could
consent to the transfusion. After a hearing the trial court refused to
appoint a guardian.
The appellate court upheld the trial court's decision stating that
the state's interest in preserving human life was a qualified one. The
need to respect fundamental individual liberties such as the free exercise of religion limited the state's interest in preserving life. The
Maryland statutes on informed consent by patients buttressed this position. The right to consent to treatment includes the right to refuse
consent.
Crouse Irving Memorial Hospital v. Paddock, 127 Misc. 2d 101, 485
N.Y.S.2d 443 (Sup. Ct. Jan. 15, 1985).
The New York Supreme Court, Special Term, has issued an order authorizing Crouse Irving Memorial Hospital and attending physicians to give blood transfusions to a mother and child during a
Caesarean section delivery despite the fact that both parents hold religious beliefs prohibiting the receipt of blood transfusions. The pregnant woman, Stacy Paddock, consented to the Caesarean section after
it became necessary due to medical complications with her pregnancy.
However, she refused to consent to any blood transfusions even
though she understood the life-threatening risk of a loss of blood during the operation.
In permitting the hospital to give transfusions to the child, the
court followed the reasoning of the New York Court of Appeals in
Matter of Sampson, 29 N.Y. 2d 900, 278 N.E. 2d 918 (1972), stating
that the state's vital interest in the welfare of the child overrides the
parent's right to free exercise of religion. As for allowing blood transfusions to the mother, the court recognized the right of a competent
adult to refuse to consent to medical treatment. However, in this case
the court reasoned that a patient requesting a physician to perform a
surgical procedure must allow the physician to properly carry out his
responsibilities. Here, it was the requested procedure that would be
the direct cause of the loss of blood. In this case the physician was
permitted to continue blood transfusions to the mother, even after
delivery, until her condition had stabilized.
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CHILD CUSTODY

In re Short, 698 P.2d 1310 (Colo. Jan. 14, 1985).
The Colorado Supreme Court has announced standards for the
consideration of the religious beliefs of parents by courts in determining child custody disputes. In doing so, it rejected an appellate court
ruling as unduly restrictive and "inconsistent with the broad scope of
review accorded to the trial court in child custody proceedings." The
appellate court had ruled that evidence concerning religious beliefs
could be admitted "only if there is a substantial probability that the
religious belief or practice will result in actual harm or endangerment
to the child's welfare."
The Colorado Supreme Court stated that courts are precluded by
the Free Exercise Clause from weighing the comparative merits of the
religious tenets of various faiths, but held that courts must not blind
themselves to evidence that bears upon the safety and welfare of the
child. "The authority of the state [to ensure the welfare of the child]
is not nullified merely because a parent grounds his claim to control
the child's course of conduct on religion or conscience." In re D.L.E.
II, 645 P.2d 271, 275 (Colo. 1982).
The court held that evidence should be admitted of religious beliefs or practices which are "reasonably likely to cause present or future harm to the physical or mental development of the child. . ..
The evidence need not be restricted to actual present harm or impairment." In this case, the father had attempted to introduce evidence
regarding the beliefs and practices of the mother as a Jehovah's Witness. This included the practices of proselytizing and door-to-door
solicitation and the belief in disassociation with people who are not
members of the Jehovah's Witness religion.

